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ABSTRACT 
BANK LENDING CHANNEL in TURKEY 
AKTAŞ, Cihan  
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Kıvılcım METİN-ÖZCAN 
 
September 2006 
 
This thesis analyses empirically the role of bank lending in monetary policy transmission 
on the basis of Turkish bank level data. First, the research addresses the theoretical 
framework of the bank lending channel, examines necessary conditions for its existence, 
and presents a simplified, but still explanatory theoretical model in the spirit of Kashyap 
and Stein’s work empowered by Peek and Rosengren’s assumptions. Second, attention 
is paid to the institutional features of Turkish financial system that make the bank 
lending channel (apart from traditional interest rate channel) a plausible candidate to 
explain the influence of the Turkish Central Bank’s monetary policy on real sector. 
Third, the paper conducts an econometric analysis of whether bank lending channel in 
fact operates in Turkey.  The main result suggests that there is a strong evidence 
supporting the operation of bank lending channel in Turkey, depending to the capital 
adequacy of the commercial banks, which is consistent with the bank lending channel 
hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: Bank Lending Channel, Turkey.   
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE’DE BANKA KREDİ KANALI  
AKTAŞ, Cihan  
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Kıvılcım METİN-ÖZCAN 
Eylül 2006 
 
Bu tez, Türk bankacılık datasına dayanarak parasal aktarım mekanizmasında banka kredi 
kanalının rolünü analiz etmektedir. İlk olarak, banka kredi kanalının teorik çerçevesi ve  
varlığı için gerekli koşullar ele alınmış, Peek ve Rosengren’in varsayımları ile 
güçlendirilmiş, Kashyap  ve Stein’in çalışmasının ruhuna uygun basit ama açıklayıcı bir 
teorik model sunulmuştur. İkinci olarak, banka kredi kanalının (geleneksel faiz 
kanalından ayrı olarak) Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası para politikasının reel 
sektör üzerindeki etkilerini açıklayan olası bir aday yapan Türk finansal sisteminin, 
kurumsal özelliklerine yoğunlaşılmıştır. Üçüncü olarak, banka kredi kanalının çalışıp 
çalışmadığına dair ekonometrik bir analiz ortaya konmuştur. Ana sonuç, teorik 
hipotezlere uygun olarak, Türkiye’de, ticari bankaların sermaye yeterlilik rasyosuna bağlı, 
banka kredi kanalının çalıştığını gösteren güçlü kanıtların olduğudur.     
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Banka Kredi Kanalı, Türkiye. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The assessment of the monetary policy transmission is vital for understanding and 
foreseeing the effects of monetary conditions on the real economy. A comprehensive 
view about the monetary policy transmission necessitates extensive evidence on the 
reaction of each sector of the economy to policy changes. 
 
 
As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) refer to it as a “black box”, there is considerable 
controversy over how exactly changes in the monetary policy are transmitted to and 
over the economy. The conventional view of monetary policy transmission, known as 
the “money view” or “interest rate view” is generally accepted. There is no doubt that 
this view, at least in the short run, can significantly influence the course of the real 
economy. However, since the recent empirical research has ascertained that monetary 
policy actions are followed by movements in real output that may last for two years or 
more (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), we need to improve our understanding of the 
transmission mechanism in order to comprehend the links between the financial and 
real sectors of the economy.  
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 Apart from the other asset price channels, an additional explanation for the 
transmission mechanism is provided by the credit channel theory. This channel points 
out that monetary policy may directly affect not only demand for loans as interest rate 
channel suggest, but also the supply of loans. More precisely, in addition to the impact 
on firms and households in the short-run, this channel states that monetary 
transmission is affected by the direct impact of monetary policy tightening (or easing) 
on financial intermediation (bank lending channel), and by the nature of the 
relationships between lenders and borrowers, especially in the presence of asymmetric 
information between them (broad credit channel). The relevance of a bank lending 
channel follows from the specific function of commercial banks as financial 
intermediaries, which is in contrast with their purely passive role in conventional interest 
rate view. Especially, for the developing countries where a significant portion of 
borrowers are bank-dependent, i.e. cannot switch to alternative sources of financing, the 
bank lending channel might have an important weight.  
 
 Within this framework, the empirical studies tried to answer whether there are 
important cross-sectional differences in the way that banks with varying characteristics 
respond to policy shocks. For this purpose, asset size, liquidity and capitalization of the 
banks were found to be important in assessing the impact of monetary policy on loan 
growth. 
  
 In this thesis, we provide empirical evidence on the effect of monetary policy 
changes on loan supply of Turkish banks (bank lending), using quarterly panel data 
based on 34 commercial banks’ balance sheet, during the period of 2003:IV–2006:II. 
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Based on the results, we make inferences on the effectiveness of the interest rate 
channel and bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission.  
  
 Our results suggest that bank lending channel of monetary policy is operating 
through the capital adequacy of Turkish banks. Although banks’ loan activity reacts to 
monetary policy i.e. interest rates, our results show that banks, that have capital 
adequacy rate above the average capital adequacy rate, respond more to monetary easing 
than the banks that have less than the average. 
 
In our analysis, we adopt the model specification of generally applied approach 
suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1995) with the theoretical assumptions of Peek and 
Rosengren (1995), to capture the effectiveness of the lending channel for the recent 
period.  
 
This research is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the 
literature on the theory of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, with an 
emphasis on the bank lending channel. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model and 
the next section introduces the empirical model. Section 5 describes the recent 
developments of the Turkish financial system, with an emphasis on the structure and 
specifics of the Turkish banking sector so as to convey those features which are likely to 
influence the transmission of monetary policy. Section 6 presents the data and the 
results of econometric estimations. Section 7 contains the concluding remarks.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In economic literature, monetary transmission mechanism is identified as the 
mechanism that transforms monetary policy actions conducted by central bank into real 
economic activity. In other words, monetary transmission mechanism is a process 
through which monetary policy decisions are transmitted into changes in income and 
inflation (Taylor, 1995). 
  
There is no doubt that monetary policy, at least in the short run, can significantly 
influence the course of the real economy. However, the recent empirical research has 
ascertained that monetary policy actions are followed by movements in real output that 
may last for two years or more (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
  
Therefore, understanding the transmission mechanism would definitely improve 
our understanding of the links between the financial and real sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, having adequate information about the transmission mechanism might 
lead to a better choice of targets which would help policy makers infer movements in 
the financial sector.  
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The following part provides a brief overview of the major transmission channels in 
literature.   
 
  
2.1 Traditional Interest Rate Channel 
 
The traditional view (Keynesian Approach) on the transmission mechanism emphasize 
the changes in the monetary aggregate affecting the output via interest rate channel. 
According to this explanation, all agents in the economy hold only two assets: money (in 
the form of currency) and bonds (all the other financial assets). The mechanism can be 
characterized by using the following schematic diagram: 
 
M↑ => r ↓ => I ↑ =>  Y ↑  
 
The diagram states that the expansionary monetary policy leads to a rise in the 
amount of bank reserves and therefore to the expansion of deposits. Since money and 
bonds are the only assets in the economy, economic agents prefer to hold more money 
and fewer bonds. Short-term interest rates should fall so that the agents accept 
additional money holdings so as asset market to come to equilibrium. Fall in real interest 
rates decreases the cost of capital which also causes a rise in investment spending. 
Increased investment drives aggregate demand and then output up.  
 
Although some economists believe that the interest rate channel is a strong 
transmission mechanism (Taylor (1995), lack of empirical support stimulated the 
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researchers to identify other transmission channels. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
identify two main mysteries concerning the conventional interest rate channel. First, 
empirical studies find expenditure components are insensitive to interest rates. Second,  
while the monetary policy have its strongest influence on short term interest rates, it is 
puzzling that monetary policy has large affects on long lived-assets which are responsive 
primarily to long term rates.  
 
These shortfalls of conventional interest rate view stimulated a lot of research on 
the alternative transmission mechanisms. In order to classify the other mechanisms, we 
follow Mishkin (1996) who lists about nine such mechanisms that can be broadly 
divided into two categories: other asset price channels and credit channels.  
   
 
2.2 Other Asset Price Channels 
 
As mentioned above, traditional interest rate channel focuses on a single asset price 
(namely, bond price). However, recent literature identifies alternative channels of 
monetary transmission that incorporates into analysis the prices of other assets. 
Following Mishkin (1996), we will discuss two key assets besides bonds that receive 
substantial attention in the literature: foreign exchange and equities. 
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2.2.1 Exchange Rate Channel 
 
Another channel through which monetary policy can affect GDP is through the impact 
on exchange rate which is also modeled in the IS-LM Model. 
 
The basic idea as discussed by Mishkin (2001) is as follows: when the central 
bank increases the money supply, it lowers short-term nominal interest rates and thus 
lowers short-term real interest rates as well. Lower short-term real interest rates imply 
that dollar denominated assets are less attractive than foreign assets leading to a decrease 
in demand for dollars. The subsequent depreciation of the dollar makes domestic goods 
cheaper than foreign goods and leads to an increase in Net Exports, and therefore in 
GDP as well. The mechanism can be characterized by using the following schematic 
diagram: 
 
M↑ => r ↓ => E ↑ => NX↑ =>  Y ↑  
 
 While the degree of the exchange rate channel depend on many circumstances 
(openness of the economy, elasticity of demand for exports and imports, etc), the 
change in the exchange rate affects the price competitiveness of the country thereby 
affecting net exports (Kuttner and Mosser, 2002). 
  
It is also argued that this channel of monetary transmission can be particularly 
important for small open economies with flexible exchange rates. In the case of a fixed 
exchange rate the effectiveness of monetary policy is significantly reduced (Kamin et al., 
1998).    
 8 
  
 
 
2.2.2 Equity Price Channel (Tobin’s q theory) 
 
Mishkin(1996) emphasize two equity price channels: Tobin’s q and wealth effects1.  
 
It is clear enough that there is a link between Tobin’s q and investment 
spending. Expansionary monetary policy can lead to a higher Q. The reasons may be 
either because market interest rates are falling leaving people with less attractive 
alternatives or because they have more money to spend, therefore they buy more stocks. 
Higher stock prices leads to a higher Q and more investment. The mechanism can be 
characterized by using the following schematic diagram: 
 
M↑ => Equity Prices↑ => Q-ratio ↑ => Investment↑ => Y ↑  
 
 Mishkin (1996) also states an alternative channel for transmission through equity 
prices occurring through wealth effects on consumption. This argument built on the 
life-cycle model of consumption developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963), in which 
households’ wealth is a key determinant of consumption spending (Kuttner and Mosser, 
2002). Stock markets surge following the expansionary monetary policy raises household 
wealth and leads individuals to spend more money. Then, consumption spending would 
grow and stimulate aggregate output.  
                                               
1 Tobin’s q is widely used theory of investment which is defined as firm’s market value divided by 
replacement cost of firm’s capital. When Q is high, firms will invest more either because adding capital is 
cheap or because the value of installed capital is high. Conversely when Q is low they will invest less 
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M↑ => Equity Prices↑ => Financial Wealth ↑ => Consumption↑ => Y ↑  
 
 It is noteworthy that the definition of “equity” could be rather broad. The 
framework above could be applied to the housing and land market where they are 
assumed as equity. The mechanism will be same (Mishkin, 1996).   
 
2.3 Credit Channel 
 
The shortfalls of traditional theory stimulated a lot of research on the alternative 
transmission mechanisms that would be able to explain how changes in the short-term 
interest rates can induce changes in the level of investment. By the way, the credit 
channel is not an alternative view to the traditional interest channel. It is an 
enhancement mechanism, not a truly independent or parallel channel. This new view of 
transmission mechanism emphasizes how asymmetric information and costly 
enforcement of contracts creates agency problems in financial markets (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995).  
 
 There are two main channels of monetary transmission relying on credit market 
frictions: i) The broad credit (i.e. balance sheet) channel and ii) the narrow credit 
channel (i.e. bank lending) channel. These channels have the potential to explain the 
empirical mysteries emerged while discussing the interest rate channel (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). The balance sheet channel emphasis on the impact of changes in 
monetary policy on the borrower’s balance sheet. The bank lending channel focuses on 
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the possible effect of monetary policy actions on the supply of loans by the banking 
system. 
 
 The credit view is important for several reasons. First, if there is a credit 
channel, it implies that monetary policy can affect the real economy without much 
variation in the open-market interest rate. Second, the channel can explain how 
monetary policy influences investment and inventory behavior. More than these, it 
offers insights on how innovation in financial institutions might affect the potency of 
monetary policy. In addition, the credit channel has the potential to explain the 
distributional effects of monetary policy on both lenders and borrowers while the 
interest rate channel cannot. Finally, it is sensitive to the state of firms’ balance sheet 
and health of the banking sector which asserts that the impact of monetary policy on 
economic activity is not always the same (Horvath et al.,2006).  
 
 
2.3.1 Balance Sheet Channel 
 
The balance sheet channel is based on the prediction that the external finance premium2 
facing a borrower should depend on borrower’s financial position. Therefore, any 
change in the quality of borrowers’ balance sheets due to monetary policy should affect 
their investment and spending decisions (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
  
                                               
2 External Finance Premium is defined by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) as the difference in cost between 
funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining earnings). 
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 This channel arises from an asymmetry of information between borrowers and 
lenders: namely the problems of moral hazard3 and adverse selection4 in financial 
markets (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996).  
  
 Mishkin (1996) states several ways in which monetary policy affects firms’ 
balance sheets: first one can be stated as; lower interest rates which increase cash flow, 
higher equity prices, inflation that reduces value of liabilities, higher aggregate demand 
which raises business revenues and profits etc. The second mechanism might be: 
enhanced balance sheets reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection problems and 
lead to easier access to funds for borrowing firms and therefore stimulates more 
economic activity. The mechanism can be characterized by using the following 
schematic diagrams:  
 
 M↑ => Equity Prices↑ => Adverse selection↓ & Moral Hazard ↓ => 
Lending ↑ => Investment↑ => Y ↑   
 or, 
 M↑ => Nominal Interest Rate↓ => Cash Flow↑ => Adverse selection↓ & 
Moral Hazard ↓ => Loans ↑ => Investment↑ => Y ↑   
 
 
                                               
3
 The lender has to wonder whether giving an increased loan to a low net-worth form may make the 
borrower pursue risky investment projects, increasing the likelihood of Project failure since the owner of 
the firm has little to lose if the firm goes under.  
    
4 The lender has to wonder if the reason that a low net-worth borrower is coming to him is because no 
one else is willing to lend to a borrower who may go under at any time.  
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2.3.2 Bank Lending Channel 
2.3.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 
Mishkin (1996) states in his article, the basis of the bank lending channel depends on the 
view that banks play a special role in the financial system because the banks are 
especially well-suited to solve asymmetric information problems in credit markets. The 
basic intuition is as follows: borrowers and lenders have a hard time matching up 
because information about each other is very costly to verify. In particular, lenders have 
a very hard time evaluating the viability of an investment project run by a borrower 
about whom they know very little. Similarly, borrowers may have a hard time finding 
lenders who are looking for projects similar to their own to invest in. In Mishkin’s view, 
the assumption behind the validity of the bank lending channel depends on these two 
headlines: 
 
(i) Banks has a special role in terms of intermediary between certain borrowers 
and credit markets. Especially in the developing countries, certain borrowers will 
not have access to the credit markets unless they borrow from banks. 
 
(ii) There should not be perfect substitutability between bank deposits and other 
sources of financing for banks.  
  
 Then the bank lending channel of monetary transmission operates as follows: 
Expansionary monetary policy increases bank reserves and bank deposits which 
increases the quantity of bank loans available. Growth of loans available will cause the 
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investment of bank-dependent firms and the spending of consumers to rise. Both of 
these will push up aggregate demand and output. This channel becomes especially vital 
for small firms, which are unable to offer shares on the stock market or issue their own 
bonds to raise money. Schematically:   
 
 M↑ => Bank deposits↑ => Bank Loans ↑ => Investment↑ => Y ↑   
 
 In order to formulate the bank lending channel of monetary transmission 
mechanism, Kashyap and Stein (1995), in addition to the two assets-economy (money 
and bonds) of the classical money view, they introduce three assets: money, publicly 
issued bonds and intermediated bonds. In this framework, banks have a special role in 
two respects: they can create money and also make loans to firms and households. They 
state that the decrease in bank reserves can considerably affect real activity if it makes 
banks reduce the supply of loans. 
  
 In order to analyze the microeconomic foundations effecting the existence and 
power of bank lending channel Kashyap and Stein (1993) rely on three conditions 
formulated earlier by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The necessary conditions that must 
hold for bank lending channel to be operative: 
 
1- Firms must not be able to completely compensate reduced supply of 
commercial bank loans from other sources. If firms are indifferent between the 
two types of financing, then the decrease in supply of loans does not affect the 
firm at all. 
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2- The Central Bank must be able to affect the supply of loans.  Put another way, 
banks must not be able to offset the decrease in deposits caused by open market 
purchases by the Central Bank by raising funds from any other source.  If it 
could raise funds from some other source, then the decrease in funds from 
deposits would not bother banks because they could simply raise funds from 
some other source. 
 
3- There must be imperfection in the adjustment of the aggregate price level.  Note 
that this is a requirement even for the money channel.  There are several 
convincing theories put forward that explain why this condition is usually 
satisfied in an economy.  This assumption is needed not only by lending channel 
view, but also by the conventional money view.  
 
 The third condition is usually met in economy according to the authors. They 
note that imperfect price adjustments is not unique to the bank lending view and is 
present in any theory where monetary policy is non-neutral.  
  
 With respect to the first condition, especially the smaller firms do not have 
access to the markets for commercial paper. Due to the asymmetric information, 
lenders’ special role and information and lock-in problems, many firms are dependent 
on loans to finance their business activities. Thus, if contractionary monetary policy 
reduces the supply of loans, these firms will be affected adversely. 
  
 Second condition requires that the commercial banks are not indifferent 
between their holdings of T-Bills (assets) relative to their holdings of CDs (liabilities). 
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Thus, after a monetary contraction, a commercial bank will not be able to perfectly 
insulate against the decrease in demand deposits by liquidating T-Bills or selling more 
CDs.  This implies that a monetary contraction will lead the commercial bank to reduce 
its supply of loans.  Therefore, it is safe to conclude that a decrease in deposits does 
indeed lead to a decrease in the supply of loans which supports second condition. 
  
 
2.3.2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
There is extensive empirical literature on this subject especially for the developed 
countries. The pioneers of the literature support the importance of traditional interest 
rate channel as well as the bank lending channel in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. In this part, without giving their empirical framework, we will discuss the 
conclusion of the selected empirical literature. 
  
 In the USA, the literature focused on the relationship between aggregate income, 
commercial bank loans, money stock, interest rates, and money indicators. We can 
mention at this point Bernanke (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992); Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Walsh and Wilcox (1995); and Oliner 
and Rudebush (1995)); amongst others.  
  
 For the selected literature in the EU area, Altunbas et al (2002), using annual 
data for the period 1991 to 1999, states that the bank-lending channel appears more 
prevalent for banks with low capitalization operating in smaller EMU countries. 
Similarly Angeloni et al. (2002), in their summary paper of the ECB conference, displays 
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the general conclusions of many countries which are mixed and may not be consistent 
with all previous empirical findings. For the country level, Hernando and Martinez-
Pages (2001) tests the existence of bank lending channel for Spanish economy and find 
no evidence for the period 1991-1998. However, Farinha and Marquez (2001) finds the 
existence of the bank lending channel in Portugese economy. Similarly, Westenlund 
(2003) finds that in Sweden small and undercapitalized banks are significantly affected 
by monetary policy, which supports the hypothesis of bank lending channel. Horvarth 
et al. (2006) investigated the working of bank lending channel using the approach of 
Kashyap and Stein and discovered asymmetric movements of loan quantities with 
respect to certain bank-characteristics in Hungary. Using the same model, Brissimis et 
al. (2001) finds compatible evidence of bank lending channel in Greece. Similarly, de 
Haan ((2001) finds that unsecured bank lending is responsive to monetary policy in the 
Netherlands. 
 
 Recently, bank lending channel is also scrutinized in the developing countries. 
For example, Alfaro et al.(2004) estimates the similar Kashyap and Stein model, using 
quarterly data, for Chilean economy. He founds a significant strength of bank lending 
channel in Chile during 1990s. One study worths to mention is those done for Korea 
(Park, 2003). Park founds that banks did not vary their lending in response to a change 
in monetary policy for the period before the currency crisis in 1997. But for the period 
after the currency crisis, bank lending reacted sensitively to monetary policy induced 
changes in call rates and reserves.      
    
The majority of empirical studies on the bank lending channel have been trying 
to test the second condition stated above where the central bank can affect the supply 
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of commercial bank loans. The studies are carried out both in a time-series framework 
and a cross-sectional framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
TURKISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
 
 
As discussed in the previous parts, there are three main assumptions whether the bank 
lending channel is relevant for a specific economy: the dominance of banks as the 
source of intermediated credit, the power of central bank to affect supply of bank loans 
through changes in available reserves and the imperfect substitutability between loans 
and bonds for certain borrowers. 
 
 In this part, the validity of these assumptions for Turkish financial system will be 
discussed. However, in order to understand the structure in the meantime, the recent 
history of the Turkish financial system will be reviewed.  
 
3.1 Review of Recent History 
 
Financial system in a country includes banks, securities exchanges, pension funds, 
insurers, central bank, national regulators and all the other institutions that provide a 
 19 
framework for carrying out economic transactions and channel savings into investment. 
Therefore, a sound financial system is essential for supporting economic growth and 
development. The basis for the soundness of the financial system is the country’s 
institutional environment which is defined as the terms of the quality of the legal 
framework and the evolutionary capabilities of the financial habitat. Moreover, 
macroeconomic indicators, surrounding the system, are also crucial for the stability of 
economy in total and financial system in specific.  Problems in the financial system may 
reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, create large fiscal costs related to rescuing 
troubled financial institutions, trigger capital flight, and deepen economic growth.  
  
In these terms, Femise Report (2005) underlies that Turkish financial system 
seems to be in its adolescence. According to this report, Turkish financial system is not 
adequately deep; that is, the total flow of funds in relation to national income is not 
high. Moreover, these limited funds are concentrated on Treasury assets and exhibit low 
diversity. In addition to these, assets are not available for all maturities, high maturity 
assets are scarce, and/or investors have preferences for certain maturities. Finally, the 
institutional perspective of the Turkish financial system has been weak.  
  
The vulnerability of the system has been experienced by two severe financial 
crises during the last two decades. The 1994 crisis was the result of the uncontrollable 
growth of domestic debt stock. The capital account liberalization from 1989 to 1994, 
the growing budget deficits and public sector borrowing requirement produced an 
overvalued domestic currency. These factors including extensive short-term borrowing 
of commercial banks, set the weak economic background prior to the crisis (Celasun, 
1998). Moreover, there were some negative fundamentals such as; high public sector 
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deficits and debt relative to GNP ratios. The existence of vulnerable banking sector and 
the efforts of the banks to close open positions which is an outcome of high offshore 
borrowing in foreign currencies led to capital outflows and the central bank heavily 
intervened in the foreign exchange market. The loss of international reserves triggered a 
crisis, and the Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70% against the U.S. dollar in the first 
quarter of 1994 (Ozatay, 2000). 
 
This crisis led the authorities to take drastic measures so as to save the economic 
system from collapse. The most controversial of them was the introduction of full 
guarantees of deposits5. However, this guarantee led the banks to offer higher interest 
rates to depositors. As a result, the full deposit insurance scheme tolerated the 
development of an unhealthy banking sector, and problems of asymmetry prevailed 
(Femise Report, 2005). During this time, CBRT tried to reduce price fluctuations in 
both the short-term Turkish lira and foreign currency markets and to establish an 
inflation expectation adaptive to foreign currency fluctuations. In summary, during the 
1990s, Turkey lacked competent supervisory authorities, a transparent regulatory 
framework and legal and institutional structure.   
 
At the beginning of 2000, Turkey adopted a comprehensive disinflation 
program, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main pillars of the 
                                               
5 In July 2000, as part of the disinflation program, the coalition government started to phase out the full 
guarantee of deposits, by lowering the ceilings to TL100 billion (more than US$150,000 at the prevailing 
exchange rate). This guarantee was re-introduced six months later in December 2000 during the liquidity 
crisis. During the collapse of Imar Bank in July 2003, the BRSA said it would adhere to the full guarantee, 
but that it would reduce the coverage to deposits that are below TL 50,000 billion (around €30,000) by 
July 2004, which was executed as planned. This ceiling is broadly in line with the deposit guarantee in EU 
countries, whereby the level of deposit protection varies between €20,000 and €60,000, but is a bit high 
for Turkey, since its average income per capita is about one-fifth of that in the EU. The ceiling covers 
over 90% of the accounts by the number of accounts, but only about 60% by the size of the accounts 
(Steinherr, Tukel and Ucer, 2004). 
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program were tight fiscal and monetary policies, ambitious structural reforms and the 
use of a pre-determined exchange rate path as a nominal anchor.  Monetary policy was 
conducted under a currency board type arrangement with liquidity expansion being 
strictly linked to foreign currency inflows.     
 
In September 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)6, 
an autonomous institution that is responsible for regulating and supervising the banking 
sector, began its operations following the enactment of new banking law in 1999. Soon 
after, the BRSA had to manage a major banking crisis brought on by the escalating 
political uncertainties, the loss of credibility by the exchange rate regime, and finally, the 
abolition of the pegged exchange rate system in February 2001 (Pazarbaşıoğlu, 2005). 
The main three shocks that hit the bank were: sharp increase in funding costs due to the 
increase in interest rates and maturity mismatch, capital losses due to a sharp mark-to-
market decline in the value of government securities holdings and capital losses due to a 
sharp change in foreign exchange rate and open foreign currency position (BRSA, 
2001). The government decided to abandon the crawling peg regime and floated the 
currency. After this most severe crisis, the government adopted a new program 
“Transition to a Strong Economy” in order to eliminate the confidence crisis and the 
financial instability.  This strategy is strongly based on market-orientation and openness 
to the world economy.  The main pillar of the program consists of a renewed effort to 
eliminate structural weaknesses that had not been fully tackled by the 2000 program, 
particularly by strengthening governance and good economic management.  The key 
elements in the area of banking include: a deep financial restructuring of state and the 
                                               
6 The mission of BRSA stated as “to ensure confidence and stability in financial markets, to create an 
environment that will improve competitiveness of the financial system, to enable effective operating of 
loan system, to protect the rights and benefits of the depositors, to take necessary measures for enabling 
institutions subject to supervision to operate in a sound, secure and well-organized manner in market 
discipline”.   
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Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF)7 banks; measures to facilitate the participation 
of private capital in the strengthening of the private banking system; and, a further 
improvement of banking regulation and supervision (BRSA, 2001).  
 
The restructuring of Turkey’s banking sector has been very costly. The initial 
fiscal costs of the resolution of the Turkish banking crisis were about €50 billion (about 
34% of the gross domestic product, GDP), and annul cost about €5 billion 
(Pazarbaşıoğlu, 2005). The GNP during 2001 contracted by 9.4%, and the loss in 
employment was around 1.4 million (Femise Report, 2005). 
 
After this severe crisis, Turkish economy has rapidly recovered and took sizeable 
steps towards restructuring its financial markets, keeping primary emphasis on the 
banking sector. Main developments of this recovery in 2002-2005 period were: adoption 
of an approach aiming for fiscal, price and financial stability, change in the behaviors of 
economic units including the public sector, efforts for well functioning of the market 
mechanism and for improving the capacity to compete internationally, continued 
process of harmonization with international standards and regulations, further 
improvements in expectations, and reducing the tax burden on economy. Along these 
national measures, continued growth in the world economy and increase in international 
trade volume, excess liquidity in international markets and improvement in external 
borrowing conditions, and the progress in relations with the European Union after the 
                                               
7 Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was under the control of the Central Bank of Turkey since 
1983 with the mandate  to insure saving deposits. It was charged with resolving insolvent banks in 1994. 
It was transferred to the BRSA on August 31, 2000. During 1997-2002, 20 banks were transferred to the 
SDIF (Pazarbaşioğlu, 2005). Among these banks, all but one have been liquidated, merged or sold, while 
Imarbank was liquidated due to bankruptcy in 2003, and in addition Kibris Kredi Bank was voluntarily 
liquidated without any burden to the public (World Bank, 2006).   
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decision to start membership negotiations with Turkey in 2005 were also the main 
international headings helped Turkish economy during this period (BAT, 2006).   
 
Since the banking sector is the largest and most important part of the Turkish 
financial sector, and other financial institutions are mostly owned or otherwise affiliated 
with the major commercial banks (World Bank, 2006) the next part will underline 
selected structural indicators of the banking system.   
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3.2 Structural Indicators of the Banking System 
  
Turkish commercial banks are classified according to their capital structure into three 
categories: state-owned, privately owned and foreign. The banks transferred to SDIF 
form an additional fourth category.  
 
3.2.1 Concentration and the Structure   
  
The banking concentration ratio is defined as the ratio of assets of the five to ten largest 
banks to the assets of the total baking sector. As shown in the table below, as of 
December 2005, the shares of the largest five banks in total assets, total deposits and 
total loans were 63 percent, 66 percent and 56 percent respectively. The largest ten 
banks have 85 percent of assets, receive 89 percent of total deposits, and extend 80 
percent of total loans. 
 
Table-1: Concentration in Banking Sector (%) 
 2001 2003 2004 2005 
Largest Five     
Assets 58 60 60 63 
Deposits 61 62 64 66 
Loans 55 54 48 56 
Largest Ten     
Assets 81 82 84 85 
Deposits 86 86 88 89 
Loans 74 75 77 80 
 Source: The Banks Association of Turkey 
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As BRSA Annual Report (2006) underlined, tendency of decrease in the number 
of banks and increase in concentration continued in 2005. With the merger of two 
deposit banks, the number of deposit banks decreased to 34 from 35, and with the 
merger of two participation banks, the number of participation banks decreased to 4 
from 5. Thus, the total banks in the sector decreased to 51 from 53. By end-2005, of the 
banks in the sector, 3 was state banks, 17 are private banks, 13 was foreign commercial 
banks, 4 was participation banks, and 13 was development and investment banks. There 
is also 1 SDIF bank in the system. 
 
Similarly, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)8, which measures the 
concentration in the sector increase to 981 points in 2005 compared to 949 points in 
2004. Therefore, it is observed that the weak oligopolistic structure in Turkish banking 
sector gradually converges to a stronger oligopolistic structure (BRSA, 2006).   
Table-2: Turkish Banking System In Terms of Number of Institutions, Branches 
and Personnel 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey 
  
                                               
8
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is an indicator widely used in measurement of concentration 
ratio of goods and services market and obtained through summing the squares of sector shares of the 
banks. 
Number of Branches Number of Personnel 2005 Number of 
Institutions 
Domestic Abroad Total Domestic Abroad Total 
State-Owned Banks 3 2,095 15 2,110 37,860 177 38,037 
Private Banks 17 3,712 25 3,737 78,475 329 78,804 
Foreign Banks 13 388 5 393 10,570 41 10,611 
Development and 
Investment Banks 
13 34 1 35 5,124 2 5,126 
SDIF 1 1 0 1 395 0 395 
Participation Banks 4 291 1 292 5,741 4 5,745 
TOTAL 51 6521 47 6568 138,165 553 138,718 
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The structure of the Turkish banking sector is changing as domestic banks are 
seeking partnership with foreign investors. With the successful implementation of 
economic program, increased confidence, political stability and start of accession talks 
with the EU, foreign investor interest in the Turkish banking sector has strengthened, 
and several deals have been made with foreign investors9. The share of banks in control 
of foreign capital in the sector increased to 5,2 percent from 3,4 percent, as well as the 
increase of the shares of foreign partnership in banks in control of domestic capital 
(BRSA, 2006). 
 
3.2.2  Capital Adequacy 
 
A minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) -the ratio that measures a bank’s capital as a 
percentage of its risk-weighted assets- is a regulatory requirement intended to ensure 
that banks maintain adequate capital to support their risk exposures. The capital 
adequacy ratio of a bank is a good indication of its vulnerability to potential shocks and 
thus the health of that bank. The capital adequacy regulations in Turkey are in line with 
those of the EU.  
  
Minimum capital adequacy ratio is set for each bank at 8 percent by the 
Regulation on measurement and Evaluation of Capital Adequacy Ratio. The CAR of the 
banking sector accounted for 9,3 percent in 2000, and increased to 20,8 percent by the 
                                               
9
 BNP Paribas bought 50 percent of Turk Ekonomi Bankasi (TEB) holding company for the bank. 
Unicredito bought 50 percent of Koc Bank. Koc/Unicredito partnership bought a 57.4 percent state of 
Yapi Kredi Bank. Disbank is acquired by Fortis, which took an 89.3 percent stake in the bank. Garanti 
Bank, strategic owner, Dogus Group, sold about half of its shares, 25.5 percent of the total stock to 
General Economic Consumer Finance. 
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end of 2001. At the end of 2004 and 2005, CAR was 28,8 percent and 24,2 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Figure-1: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
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Source: FSR (2006) 
 
 The average capital adequacy ratio of the Turkish banking system is high 
compared with the EU average and of the candidate countries. As of 2003, the average 
capital adequacy ratios of the banking system for EU average and the candidate 
countries are; 12,5 percent and 16,67 percent, respectively.    
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3.2.3 Asset Quality 
 
State-owned banks retain a very significant role in the Turkish banking system. The 
three large deposit taking state-owned banks are slated for privatization. State-owned 
banks are important in determining the asset quality of the banking sector. One third of 
the assets of the Turkish banking system are controlled by the state-owned banks. The 
number of these banks is three (namely Ziraat Bank, Halk Bank and Vakifbank); their 
total share in the financial system as of December 2005 is 30.6%. While they have 
collected 37.6% of the total deposits by December 2005, they have extended 20.2% of 
the total loans. The table below shows the market shares of the groups in terms of 
assets, loans and deposits.   
 
Table-3: Market Shares by Groups 
  Share in Total Assets 
(%) 
Share in Total Loans 
(%) 
Share in Total Deposits 
(%) 
  2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
State-owned 
Banks 
32.6 34.1 30.6 17.4 20.1 20.2 37.6 41.1 37.6 
Private Banks 53.9 53.9 58.3 63.2 62.8 65.4 53.6 51.6 55.1 
SDIF 2.8 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 
Foreign 4.7 5.5 5.1 6.7 7.3 6.5 3.6 4.1 4.0 
Investment and 
Development 
Banks 
3.9 3.6 3.1 7.2 5.1 3.8 - - - 
Participation 
Banks 
2.1 2.4 2.4 4.5 4.7 4.1 2.6 3.0 3.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: BRSA 
 
Since 2002 total assets of Turkish Banking System is growing steadily. As of 
2005 total assets reached USD 295.8 billion. During this period loan portfolio of 
Turkish Banking system also displayed an impressive growth. As of December 2005, the 
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amount of in-cash loans extended by banks was USD 111.7 billion and the ratio of loans 
to deposits was 64.5%. The non-performing loans which amounted USD 9.6 billion in 
end-2001, decreased to USD 5.6 billion as of December 2005. The amount of 
provisions set aside for these loans was USD 5.0 billion.  
 
Table-4: Main Indicators of the Banking Sector 
USD Million 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total Assets 154,955 116,661 130,120 178,880 228,328 295,844 
Loans 47,404 23,899 29,967 47,442 74,020 111,743 
Non-
performing 
Loans (gross) 
5,895 9,595 6,381 6,182 4,736 5,587 
Securities 
Portfolio 
27,485 41,059 52,680 76,545 123,680 106,585 
Deposits 87,680 75,938 84,413 111,268 142,363 181,190 
Source: BRSA 
 
Figure-2: Share of Credits in Total Assets, 2000-2005 
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3.2.4 Asset Structure 
 
As a part of restructuring program, government debt securities were given to the banks. 
Therefore, securities had become the largest item in the asset structure of the Turkish 
banking system. However, in 2005, compared to the previous year, its share declined by 
4 percentage points, to 35 percent, due to more rapid increase in the loan portfolio. The 
share of loans in total assets rose by 6 percentage points to 41 percent due to strong 
growth in economic activity and the rise in demand for corporate loans and consumer 
loans.  
 
 
Figure-3: Asset Structure of the Banking Sector 
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3.2.5 Structure of Liabilities 
 
In 2005, total deposits increased by 28 percent, but its share in total liabilities decrease 
by 1 percentage point to 62 percent when compared to the previous year. The share of 
own funds in total liabilities is 13 percent. The share of due banks in total liabilities 
increased by 2 points and stood at 13 percent.  
 
 
Figure-4: Liability Structure of the Banking Sector 
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3.2.6 Comparison with EU Countries 
 
Turkey has fulfilled most of the conditions required for the banking sector to comply 
with the integration process for the EU. Despite the adverse macroeconomic economic 
conditions, the Turkish banking sector continues to demonstrate progress and even the 
core Turkish banking sector proved to be resilient in terms of selected indicators, such 
as high quality of human resources, technological infrastructure, a nationwide branch 
network, and high-quality service provided in a variety of financial products 
(Pazarbasioglu, 2005).  
  
The table below shows the comparison of selected balance sheet items with EU 
countries. Total loans and total deposits to GDP ratios, which are good indicators of 
financial depth and the level of intermediation in the system, are below the averages of 
EU countries in 2004 and 2005.  
 
  
Table-5: Comparison of Selected Balance Sheet Items with EU Countries 
Countries 
Deposits/GDP 
(%) 
Loans/GDP 
(%) 
Loans/Deposits 
(%) 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
(%) 
Belgium 143 107 75 33 
Denmark 63 166 264 53 
Germany 113 136 120 46 
Greece 96 76 80 55 
Spain 104 121 116 59 
France 77 93 121 35 
Ireland 123 176 144 36 
Italy 58 88 152 52 
Luxembourg 859 467 54 17 
Netherlands 122 174 142 51 
Austria 98 125 128 45 
Portugal 103 138 134 56 
Finland 53 69 130 49 
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Sweden 51 115 224 55 
UK 118 142 121 35 
EU15 Ave. 99 122 124 42 
EU25 Ave. 96 118 123 42 
TURKEY     
2004 46 24 53 33 
2005 52 32 63 39 
Source: FSR (2006) 
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3.3 Bank Lending Channel as a Powerful Transmission 
Mechanism in Turkish Economy 
 
Before starting this part, let’s remind Kashyap and Stein (1997) setting, on the basis of 
four indicators of the relative importance of the bank lending channel in the EU 
countries (EU-12). The first indicator refers to the concentration of the banking system: 
the more concentrated the system, the less sensitive is expected to be its responsiveness 
to monetary policy shocks, given that large banks can more easily substitute other 
liabilities that are not subject to reserve requirements and/or are uninsured, for deposits. 
The second indicator is the rate of return on bank assets: other things being equal, the 
more well-capitalised a bank, the higher its expected profitability, since the cost its funds 
is relatively lower. On the other hand, well capitalised banks should have an easier 
access to capital markets to raise funds in the event of a deposit shock, implying that 
monetary policy would have less of an impact on those banks. The third indicator 
relates to the size of firms: smaller firms are more dependent on bank financing than 
larger firms, as monitoring costs for small firms are so high that they would have 
difficulties in securing non-bank financing. Thus, for a given contraction of bank credit, 
these firms will be affected more. Finally, the fourth indicator refers to the importance 
of non-bank financing, in particular equity and bond financing. Where the availability of 
non-bank financing is greater, the efficacy of the bank lending channel is likely to be 
less. 
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Apart from the indicators above, as discussed in the previous parts, there are 
three main assumptions whether the bank lending channel is relevant for a specific 
economy: the dominance of banks as the source of intermediated credit, the power of 
central bank to affect supply of bank loans through changes in available reserves and the 
imperfect substitutability between loans and bonds for certain borrowers.  
  
3.3.1 Dominance of Turkish Banks as the source of intermediated 
loans 
 
If banks rely on mostly reservable demand deposits as an important source  of funds, 
contractionary monetary policy, by reducing the aggregate volume of bank reserves, will 
reduce the availability of bank loans to the real economy. Since a significant number of 
firms and households rely heavily on bank financing, they cannot easily switch to 
alternative forms of external financing and a reduction in loan supply will decrease 
aggregate spending. 
  
Similar to most of the developing countries, domestic loan in Turkey is 
exclusively dependent on the lending capacity of Turkish banking system. Other sources 
of financing such as stock exchange and alternative non-financial credit institutes are 
unimportant. 
  
The banking sector is the largest and most important part of the Turkish 
financial system. Especially when CBRT and ISE market capitalization (market value of 
the publicly held companies) is omitted, it is observed that the banking sector reached 
about 86 % of total financial sector. 
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Table-6: Size and Composition of the Turkish Financial Sector 
 Total Assets % Distribution 
 TRY 
(million) 
USD 
(billion) 
Including 
CBRT 
Excluding 
CBRT 
Excluding 
ISE Mar. 
Assets
/GDP 
% 
Banks 396,967 295.6 51.4 58.2 85.5 81.3 
Participation Banks 9,945 7.4 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.0 
Insurance Companies 5,574 4.2 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.1 
Leasing Companies 6,708 5.0 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 
Factoring Companies 4,691 3.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Securities Inter. Inst. 3,341 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Pension Companies 4,234 3.2 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 
Securities Inv. Funds 29,374 21.9 3.8 4.3 6.3 6.0 
Consumer Finance Com. 1,769 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Real Estate Inv.Trust 2,209 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Securities Investment Trust 488 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
ISE market Capitalization 218,318 162.6 28.3 32.0 - 44.7 
Central Bank TR 90,070 67.1 11.7 - - 18.5 
TOTAL 772,688 575.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 158.3 
 Source: BRSA (2006) 
  
The composition of the loan market confirms that access to credit for SMEs is 
poor, since the bank loan has been concentrated with few firms, and leasing and 
factoring volumes remain small (World Bank, 2006). 
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3.3.2 The power of Central Bank to affect of bank loans 
 
In general view, the credit channel of monetary transmission mechanism works if banks 
reduce their supply of loans in response to a squeezing of bank reserves by 
contractionary monetary policy. 
 
Kashyap and Stein (1993) underlines two factors that influence central bank’s  
capacity to control lending. These are the participation of non-banking financial 
institutions in the economy and existence of capital requirements. 
 
Non-bank financial institutions can collect deposits and issue loans, but in many 
countries they do not face reserve requirements on their deposits. So, the larger the 
participation of non-banking financial institutions in loan supply, the weaker is the 
ability of a central bank to manage loan supply. 
 
According to Financial Stability Report (FSA, 2006), in 2005, total asset size of 
the Turkish financial sector amounted to 469,9 billion New Turkish Liras and about 87 
percent of financial sector assets are composed of bank assets (including development 
and investment banks and participation banks).  As seen in the figure below, banks 
dominate the Turkish financial system. Therefore, non-bank financial institutions hardly 
play a serious role in loan supply. 
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Figure-5: Balance Sheet Size of the Financial Sector 
Balance Sheet Size of the Financial Sector
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In terms of capital adequacy, On 31 January 2002, the BRSA issued a regulation 
on the measurement and assessment of the capital adequacy of banks10. This regulation 
established the methodology for the calculation of capital adequacy ratios of banks on 
both a consolidated and unconsolidated basis to ensure that they maintain an adequate 
amount of capital against existing and potential losses. The ratio of own funds to risk-
weighted assets, non-cash loans and obligations will be a minimum 8%. Similarly to 
generally accepted EU principles, the category of own funds consist of two elements: 
core capital and supplementary capital.  
  
                                               
10
 The regulation is available at http://www.bddk.org.tr/turkce/mevzuat/sermaye_yet_y2.doc  
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Remembering that the average capital adequacy of Turkish banks in 2005 is 24,5 
percent, it is not binding for the commercial banks which does not undermine the 
importance of bank lending channel in Turkey.  
 
3.3.3 Imperfect substitutability between loans and bonds for certain 
borrowers   
 
Final assumption of the bank lending channel is the imperfect substitutability between 
credits and other financial assets in the banks’ balance sheet on the one hand, and that 
between bank credits and other forms of financing on firms’ balance sheet on the other 
hand. 
 
Imperfect substitution in banks’ assets ensures that a tightening (loosening) of 
monetary policy brings about a contraction (expansion) in banks’ credit supply. As a 
response to a monetary and hence liquidity tightening, banks have two ways to offset 
reserve drains and accordingly to prevent their loan supply from declining. First one is 
to reduce their credit supply instead of selling bonds they own because they have the 
desired level of liquidity to face. Alternatively, banks could also issue bonds or collect 
deposits from households or from the corporate sector rather than decrease credit. 
However, the ability of some banks to borrow from financial markets may be limited by 
financial market imperfections, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (imperfect 
substitutability between credits and bonds on the asset side and bonds and deposits on 
the liability side).  
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On the other side, for monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy, it 
is necessary for some firms not to be capable of substituting bank credit for other forms 
of external funding on the capital markets (imperfect substitutability on the liability side 
of firms). In such a case, once credit supply has decreased (increased), investment 
spending will be cut back because of the lack of external financial resources. 
 
In Turkey, despite the decline of their share, deposits are the main source of 
funding. As of June 2005, the share of deposits declined to 60.7 percent from 64.9 
percent in 2002. The figure below underlines that the significant increase indication and 
securitization credits play an important role in this development. 
 
Table-7 : Source of Funds of the Firms 
Source of Funds 
 2002 2003 2004 June 2005 
Deposits (Billions of US 
Dollars) 
84 111 142 153 
Deposits/Liabilities (%) 64.9 62.2 62.3 60.7 
Gross Loans/Total Deposits 
Ratio (%) 
43.1 48.2 55.3 62.9 
Securitization Credits 
(billions of US Dollars) 
2 3 4 7 
Syndication Credits  (billions 
of US Dollars) 
2 3 6 6 
Source: Basci (2006) 
 
As a result, assumptions for bank lending channel seem to be satisfied for 
Turkish economy, especially in the last decade. This provides a strong support for our 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
  
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 
Following Peek and Rosengren (1995), in order to understand an independent lending 
channel, let’s consider a simple bank balance sheet. This simple bank has only reserves 
and securities as assets, and transactions deposits and capital as liabilities. In this simple 
model, open market operations which decrease reserves will cause interest rates to rise. 
This will induce the individuals and firms to hold fewer transactions deposits until 
transaction deposits have declined enough to bring required reserves back into line with 
available reserves. Consequently, bank will hold fewer bonds and individuals hold more. 
This mechanism describes the traditional “money view” which operates solely through 
the user of capital, as interest rates rise to equate money demand and money supply. 
 
Now, so as to expose an additional channel, let’s add more complicated financial 
intermediaries to both sides of the bank balance sheet namely, loans and (nonreservable) 
nontransactions deposits. In this model, the balance sheet has three assets (namely 
reserves, securities, and loans) and three liabilities (namely (reservable) transactions 
deposits, (nonreservable) nontransactions deposits, and capital). In this case, an open 
market operation that decreases reserves might have additional effects that operate 
through the asset side of the bank balance sheet. The decrease in reserves decreases 
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transactions deposits. This will result in a decrease in loans if not offset by an increase in 
nontransactions deposits or a decrease in securities holdings.  
 
The lending channel exists if the above mechanism operates. Therefore, the 
necessary condition for the lending channel is that the loans not be totally insulated 
from monetary policy changes by banks altering their nontransactions deposits and 
securities sufficiently to offset completely any change in their transactions deposits.  
 
One step further, the lending channel above could be significantly reduced by 
banks being capital-constrained as Kashyap and Stein (1995) acknowledges. Their story 
is that when the FED drains deposits from the system, banks cannot frictionlessly make 
up the funding shortfall by raising nondeposit external finance. Consequently, their 
lending behavior is affected, and so in turn is the investment spending of those 
nonfinancial firms that rely on banks for funding. Actually, they find no evidence of this 
effect in their data because of the level of disaggregation and the relatively short time 
series that they worked on.  
 
In order to test the size of the effect of monetary policy is likely o be effected by 
capital constraint banks, we consider a highly simplified one-period model whose 
behavior described by Peek and Rosengren (1995).    
 
In this model, the bank has three types of assets described above: loans (L), 
securities (S), and required reserves (R) and three liabilities: capital (K), transactions 
deposits (DD) and, nontransactions deposits (CD).  
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Balance sheet constraint requires the equality of total assets and total liabilities: 
  
R + S + L = K + DD + CD     (1) 
 
On the liabilities side, Capital is assumed to be fixed in the short-run and 
transaction deposits are assumed to be inversely related to the market interest rate 
(namely, federal funds rate, rf).  An increase in market interest rates increase the 
opportunity cost of holding such deposits, causing bank customers to reduce their 
holdings of transactions deposits and shift into interest paying assets. 
 
Transactions deposits are tied to check-clearing services and convenience, 
therefore this market tends to be imperfectly competitive. In order to maximize their 
monopoly rent in transactions deposits, banks set imperfectly competitive retail deposit 
interest rates. Therefore, transactions deposits can be treated as determined by profit-
maximizing interest rate setting regardless to the bank’s overall need for funding. 
  
 DD = a0 – a1rf       (2) 
 
We also assume that, banks can expand total deposits by offering an interest rate 
on nontransactions deposits (rD) greater than the mean rate in its market (rD
m). Offering 
a deposit rate greater than the mean market rate will draw funds not only from 
competitor banks but also from other substitute financial instruments, such as money 
market mutual funds and Treasury securities. 
  
CD = f0 + f1(rD - rD
m)      (3) 
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On the asset side, banks must hold a fraction (α) for their reserve requirement 
ratio times their transactions deposits (DD). We assume that banks hold no excess 
reserves. Securities are assumed to compose a fixed proportion of transactions deposits 
(h) net of reserves. This will be a buffer stock motive for holding securities. 
 
 R = αDD       (4) 
 S = h0 + h1DD – R      (5) 
 
Similar to the transactions accounts, market for loans is also imperfectly 
competitive. A bank can increase (decrease) its credit volume by offering a credit rate 
(rL) lower (higher) than the average credit rate in its market (rL
m). Taking into account 
that the bank loans are unique source of finance to many firms (especially the small 
ones), the value of g1(the sensitivity of credit demand to a change in the bank’s credit 
interest rate) is likely to be large. 
 
 L = g0 – g1 (rL - rL
m)      (6) 
 
The market rates are assumed to be directly related to the federal funds rate with 
fixed spreads. To simplify the algebra, the same amount (φ) is assumed for each market. 
 
 rD
m = b0 + φ rF      (7) 
 rL
m = c0 + φ rF       (8) 
 rS
m = e0 + φ rF       (9) 
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Bank profits are simply the sum of interest income on loans (rLL) net of loan 
losses (θL) and interest received on securities (rSS), minus interest paid on transactions 
deposits (rDDDD) and interest paid on nontransactions deposits (rDCD).  
 
 Π = (rL – θ)L + rSS - rDDDD - rDCD    (10) 
 
Following Kishan and Opiela (2000), we do not specify a capital constraint as 
Peek and Rosengren did. Their capital constraint assumes that regulators force 
undercapitalized (capital constrained) banks to meet the risk-weighted capital 
requirement. Given that regulators may have changed the intensity of their examinations 
over time, over regions, and over banks, this constraint may not apply. Rather, iti is 
assumed that market discipline by TD purchasers place a funding constraint on banks.  
 
Using equations (1) to (9) to eliminate R, DD, L, S, rD, rL, and the three market 
interest rates, the maximization problem can be stated as a Lagrangian equation, 
maximizing the profit function. The Lagrangian equation is maximized with respect to 
CD to obtain the first-order condition. Next, first-order conditions are used to solve for 
CD in the equation. In a similar way, the equations are solved for L and S.  
 
The results for the derivatives of the L, CD, and S equations with respect to rF:  
 
∂L / ∂rF  =  -g1a1(1-h1) / (f1 +g1) ‹ 0, assuming h1 ‹ 1    (11) 
∂CD / ∂rF = f1 a1(1-h1) / (f1 +g1) › 0, assuming h1 ‹ 1   (12) 
∂S / ∂rF = - a1(h1 - α) ‹› 0       (13) 
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Nontransaction deposits increase with an increase in federal funds rate. 
However, with an increase in the federal funds rate, loans decline as long as h1 is less 
than 1. This is a reasonable assumption, given that only a proportion of deposits would 
be held in liquid form to cover possible withdrawals of transactions deposits. Finally, 
the response of securities is indeterminate. If the federal funds rate increase, well-
capitalized banks can sell securities to continue providing loans. Therefore, for well-
capitalized banks (13) is likely to be negative.  
 
 Additional implications of this model could be derived with referring to 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) argument which argues that large and small banks face 
different market conditions in raising marginal sources of funding (nontransactions 
deposits). If so, Peek and Rosengren (1995) states that f1 will be positively related to the 
size of the bank. Therefore, in this model, nontransactions deposits at larger banks will 
be more responsive to changes in the federal funds rate compared to those at smaller 
banks, and loans at larger banks will be less responsive.  
 
Following the same line, another possibility would be loans at large banks, 
whose borrowers have greater access to national credit markets, have greater sensitivity 
to changes in loan rates than loans at smaller banks. This implies that g1 will be larger 
for larger banks. In this case, nontransactions deposits at larger banks will be less 
responsive to changes in the federal funds rate than those at smaller banks, and loans 
will be more responsive. 
 
The assumptions above, larger values of f1 and g1 for larger banks, have opposite 
effects on the magnitude of the response to changes in the federal funds rate of both 
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transactions deposits and loans. Therefore, the net effect is ambiguous. Focusing on 
differing responses by large and small banks, as emphasized in Kashyap and Stein 
(1994), may not provide clear evidence unless one has priors on the magnitudes of the 
effects of bank size on the values of f1 and g1.  
 
At the end, Peek and Rosengren (1995) states that since we have little evidence 
on their relative responses (f1 and g1) to changes in bank size, the clearest distinctions 
are likely to be between capital-constrained (weak) and unconstrained (strong) banks, 
rather than between large and small banks. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
Following from Peek and Rosengren (1995) theoretical model, we want to empirically 
test the hypothesis that strong and weak bank react differently to a change in monetary 
policy. The effect of bank capital and bank asset on the response of loans to change in 
the monetary policy will also be tested. As discussed above, the theory predicts that 
better capitalized banks should be less sensitive to changes in policy and the impact of 
asset size is ambiguous.  
  
Therefore, our empirical model will try to explain the growth rate of bank loans, 
∆LN, for each banks i = 1, 2, …, N in time period t = 1, 2, …, T. 
  
In our empirical model, the main exogenous indicator variable describing 
monetary shocks is interest rate, it. As in Turkey, monetary authority controls the short-
term nominal interest rate.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use the change in the short-
term interest rate under the control of the central bank as a good measure of monetary 
policy shocks. Most of the empirical literature uses the same variable as the policy 
indicator as well. Along the same line, we will use the Turkish Central Bank short-term 
(overnight) interest rate as the policy indicator. 
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The effect of monetary policy on bank loan depends on the balance sheet 
strength of a bank. Therefore, we include second set of explanatory variables that 
interacts with the change in it and a measure of balance sheet strength of a bank. 
Empirical papers typically use assets size (Ait), liquidity (LQit), or capitalization (CAit) as 
separating variables. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Asset 
size is measured by total assets. Capitalization is defined as the shareholders’ equity to 
total assets.  
  
Since we are testing whether the CBRT can affect the supply of loans, we have 
to isolate the change in total loans caused by movements in loan demand. In general, 
control variables like GDP or CPI have traditionally used in the model so as to account 
for loan demand movements for the consecutive years. However, macroeconomic 
aggregates are common for all banks and fail to capture demand changes for an 
individual bank. So, as Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) 
discussed, measures like real certificates of deposits and bank securities were suggested 
so as to better control for cross-sectional differences in loan demand.  Therefore, we 
use total deposits (TD) to proxy movements in demand for loans of a particular bank.  
  
We also have to include lagged values of both dependent and explanatory 
variables to allow for dynamic effects for two reasons. First, there is a close banker-
customer relationship that develops and may create lock-in effects thus making it costly 
for the borrower to change a bank. Thus lagged loans affect current loans. Second, 
monetary policy only impacts lending behavior with a lag due to contractual 
commitments (e.g. floating and fixed charges on movable and immovable assets, 
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respectively). Hence, lagged values of the explanatory variables also affect current loans 
with a lag.  
  
The main assumption stated above in the theoretical model, indicates that 
constrained and unconstrained banks should respond quite differently to changes in 
monetary policy. Therefore, our focus will be on the determinants of the change in bank 
loans. 
  
The key implication is that the response of loans to a tightening (an easing) of 
monetary policy at unconstrained banks should be to decline (increase) more than at 
capital-constrained banks (Peek and Rosengren, 1995).    
  
At this point, we introduce a dummy variable so as to identify the distinction 
between capital-constrained and unconstrained banks. Since, capital adequacy ratio is a 
measure of the amount of a bank's capital expressed as a percentage of its risk weighted 
credit exposures, we can use Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) as an indicator to see 
whether a bank is capital-constrained or unconstrained. 
 
However, in order to differentiate between those banks, first, we calculated the 
average capital adequacy for all banks in years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, and then 
assign 1 if the specific bank’s CAR is above the average CAR, and 0 if the bank’s CAR is 
below the average CAR.   
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Following that, we create an interaction variable defined as the interaction 
between our dummy (1 if unconstrained, 0 if unconstrained) and the change in our 
exogeneous indicator -short-term nominal interest rate-.      
 
Therefore, the model is as follows: 
 
∆LNit = αi + Σj β∆LNit (-1) + Σj γ ∆it-j + Σj δ ∆it-j Dummy + θj BSit-1 + 
Σj TDEit-1 + εit   
 
where ∆LNit is the growth of bank loan of bank i in year t. ∆it-j is the annualized, 
average weighted,  CBRT  overnight rate.  
 
BSit includes assets size (Ait), liquidity (LQit), and capitalization (CAit) as the 
balance sheet strength of the a bank.  
 
TDE is the growth rate of total deposits. 
 
Coefficients on ∆it-j determine a response to a monetary shock by an average 
bank. Coefficients on interaction variable describe how a response differs for 
constrained and unconstrained banks. For an operational lending channel to exist it is 
sufficient that all coefficients on ∆it-j are negative and the coefficients on BSit are 
positive. The most important coefficient for our purpose will be the interaction variable 
which will state whether bank lending channel works 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DATA and ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
6.1 Data  
 
The use of bank level data has supplemented the empirical analysis of the role of bank 
lending in monetary transmission. We follow the same methodology so as to address the 
issue that monetary policy actions may affect banks’ loan supply. 
 
We use quarterly balance sheet data from 2001:4 to 2006:3 for 34 Turkish 
commercial banks. We limit our sample to commercial banks, because development and 
investment banks do not collect a deposit that is important for our analysis.  
 
The balance sheet data on those banks are taken from statistical reports of the 
Banks Association of Turkey11. Therefore, we have 34*15=510 (N=34 and t=15) 
observations in our dataset.  
 
The exogenous indicator variable is the Turkish Central Bank short-term 
(overnight) interest rate which is parallel to Bernanke and Blinder (1992) methodology.  
Also, the reason for taking the overnight interest rate stems from the fact that the 
                                               
11
 Available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/net/donemsel/  
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CBRT started to implement inflation targeting regime, where short-term interest rates 
are used as the main policy instruments. However, in order to get a quarterly data to be 
consistent with banks’ balance sheet data, we calculated an average overnight interest 
rate for every three-month period. This data is taken from the EVDS dataset of the 
CBRT.  
 
Total assets and total liabilities are defined as the sum of all bank assets and 
liabilities, respectively.   
  
Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and is taken as the 
sum of cash and balances in CBRT, due from banks, other financial institutions and, 
money market securities. 
 
Capital is proxied by bank equity and capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is calculated 
as the capital over total assets.  
 
 
6.2 Estimation Results 
 
The role of the bank lending is at the core of the “bank lending view”, we focus on the 
empirical analysis on the change in bank loans. In the model, we included all the 
variables which the empirical literature finds important to explain the loan movements.  
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 Since some bank-specific factors may affect the loan movements such as 
corporate culture, quality of the managers, governance of the bank, etc., we use the 
fixed effects estimator so as to include the fixed effects.    
 
  As discussed above, lagged values of both dependent and explanatory variables 
are included in order to allow for dynamic effects for two reasons. First, there is a close 
banker-customer relationship that develops and may create lock-in effects thus making 
it costly for the borrower to change a bank. Thus lagged loans affect current loans. 
Second, monetary policy only impacts lending behavior with a lag due to contractual 
commitments (e.g. floating and fixed charges on movable and immovable assets, 
respectively). Hence, lagged values of the explanatory variables may also affect current 
loans with a lag. 
 
 Structured before, our model is: 
 
∆LNit = αi + Σj β∆LNit (-1) + Σj γ ∆it-j + Σj δ ∆it-j Dummy + θj BSit-1 + 
Σj TDEit-1 + εit   
 
where ∆LNit is the growth of bank loan of bank i in year t. ∆it-j is the annualized, 
average weighted,  CBRT  overnight rate.  
 
BSit includes assets size (Ait), liquidity (LQit), and capitalization (CAit) as the 
balance sheet strength of the a bank.  
 
TDE is the growth rate of total deposits. 
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TABLE-8 : REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Loan Growth 
           
 Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Total Loans (∆LN)a 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
∆LN(-1)   0.02 
(0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
0.00 
(-0.10) 
0.02 
(0.49) 
-0.00 
(-0.10) 
∆i -1.13* 
(-2.49) 
-0.87 
(-0.17) 
-1.10* 
(-2.29) 
-0.05 
(-0.10) 
-1.10* 
(-2.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.07) 
-1.11* 
(-2.28) 
-0.05 
(-0.10) 
-1.08 
(-1.88) 
-0.11 
(-0.17) 
∆i (-1)         -0.02 
(-0.03) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
∆i*Dummy  -3.31
** 
(-3.85) 
 -3.35** 
(-3.69) 
 -3.59** 
(-3.82) 
 -3.57** 
(-3.80) 
 -3.46** 
(-3.73) 
LIQ     -0.01 
(-0.60) 
-0.00 
(-0.27) 
-0.00 
(-0.63) 
-0.00 
(-0.30) 
-0.02** 
(-2.93) 
-0.02* 
(-2.55) 
LIQ(-1)         0.02** 
(3.58) 
0.02** 
(3.35) 
CAR     -0.01 
(0.79) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.83) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.00 
(-0.35) 
CAR(-1)         0.00 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.74) 
∆TA     0.26 
(1.73) 
0.31* 
(2.03) 
0.28* 
(1.82) 
0.32* 
(2.11) 
0.38 
(1.78) 
0.40 
(1.94) 
∆TA(-1)         0.02 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.38) 
∆TDE       0.01 
(1.48) 
0.01 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(1.82) 
0.01 
(1.75) 
∆TDE(-1)         0.01* 
(2.41) 
0.01* 
(2.58) 
           
R2 = *** 
Prob>F**** 
 
0.0123 
0.0101 
0.0416 
0.0078 
0.0160 
0.0207 
0.0386 
0.0095 
0.0334 
0.0789 
0.0569 
0.0290 
0.0418 
0.0882 
0.0624 
0.0319 
0.0684 
0.1165 
0.0753 
0.0328 
 
a
 Values of t-statistics in parantheses 
* Significant at the 5 percent confidence level. 
** Significant at the 1 percent confidence level. 
***  R2 overall value. 
**** F test that all u_i=0 
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Table 8 presents the regression results with different sets of regressors. The 
main explanatory variables are interest rate and the interaction variable. As mentioned 
before, our interaction variable is defined as the interaction between our dummy (1 if 
unconstrained, 0 if unconstrained) and the change in our exogeneous indicator -short-
term nominal interest rate-. The dependent variable is growth rate of total loans. The 
first column displays the names of the explanatory variables used in the regressions.  
 
The first regression examines the response of growth rate of total loans to 
change in the change interest rate (∆i) by simply using ∆i as a regressor. As expected, 
the variable is significant and has a negative sign. This result implies that in very general 
terms, conventional interest rate channel works for the Turkish economy.  
 
The main question in this analysis is trying to answer is whether capital-
unconstrained banks are affected more by the monetary policy actions. To be able to 
answer this question, as discussed in the previous section, we include the interaction 
variable which is multiplication of the dummy variable with the ∆i. Thus, the coefficient 
of the interaction variable shows the difference of the response of capital-unconstrained 
banks (banks with above average capital adequacy ratio) from the response of capital-
constrained banks.  
 
The results of the second regression are presented at the third column. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable is significant at one percent level and the 
coefficient is negative. With the addition of the interaction variable the coefficient of the 
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interest rate became insignificant. As expected these results show that capital-
unconstrained banks respond significantly more than capital-constrained banks.  
 
The fourth column displays the results of the third regression. The third 
regression includes the lag of ∆LN as a control variable. ∆i is still significant at five 
percent level with a coefficient of -1.1. In the next regression, the interaction variable is 
included. The coefficient of the interaction variable is significant at one percent level 
and the coefficient is negative. When we add the interaction variable the coefficient of 
the interest rate became insignificant. 
 
The fifth regression includes the lag of ∆LN, liquidity, capital adequacy ratio and 
change in total assets as control variables. ∆i is still significant at five percent level with a 
coefficient of -1.1. The next column presents the regression with the addition of the 
interaction variable. The coefficient of the interaction variable is significant at one 
percent level and the coefficient is negative. Similarly, with the addition of the 
interaction variable the coefficient of the interest rate became insignificant.  
 
The seventh regression includes the lag of ∆LN, liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, 
change in total assets and change in total deposits as control variables. ∆i is still 
significant at five percent level with a coefficient of -1.11. Interaction variable is 
included for the following regression. The coefficient of the interaction variable is 
significant at one percent level and the coefficient is negative. Similar to the previous 
results, the coefficient of the interest rate became insignificant when the interaction 
variable is included..  
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The ninth regression includes the lag of ∆LN, liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, 
change in total assets, change in total deposits, and lags of all explanatory variables as 
control variables. ∆i is still significant with a coefficient of -1.08. The last column 
presents the regression with the addition of the interaction variable. The coefficient of 
the interaction variable is significant at one percent level and the coefficient is negative 
and the coefficient of the interest rate became insignificant as before.  
 
The main result that we get out of the regressions is that the response of loans 
to a monetary tightening at unconstrained banks is a decline more than the capital-
constrained banks. Furthermore, when the interaction variable is included in the 
regression set, the significance of the interest rate decreases. Such a result implies that, 
the policy instrument of the CBRT (short-term interest rate) is effective only for the 
banks which have capital adequacy ratio above the sector average. In this context, we 
may say that the monetary transmission mechanism through bank lending channel have 
asymmetric effects and this asymmetry stems from the capital adequacy ratio (CAR).    
Thus, our results provide empirical support for Peek and Rosengren (1995). We used 
several control variables and tried different interest rates as monetary policy indicators. 
The regression results are not sensitive to the selection of interest rates. So, we believe 
that our results are robust and reliable.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Improving our understanding of the transmission mechanism has important 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy by central bank. Apart from traditional 
interest rate channel and other asset price channels, bank lending channel has an 
important weight where a significant portion of borrowers are bank-dependent and 
cannot switch to alternative sources of financing. 
 
 The literature predicts that if bank lending channel exists than the response of 
loans to a tightening (an easing) of monetary policy at unconstrained banks should be to 
decline (increase) more than at capital-constrained banks. 
 
 In this thesis, we provide empirical evidence on the effect of monetary policy 
changes on loan supply of Turkish banks, using quarterly panel data based on all 
Turkish commercial banks’ balance sheet, during the period of 2003:IV–2006:II.  In our 
analysis, we adopt the model specification of generally applied approach suggested by 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) with the theoretical assumptions of Peek and Rosengren 
(1995), to capture the effectiveness of the lending channel for the relevant period. 
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We found the evidence of bank lending channel of monetary policy, operating 
through the capital adequacy of the banks. Although banks’ loan activity reacts to 
monetary policy i.e. interest rates, our results show that banks, that have capital 
adequacy rate above the average capital adequacy rate, respond more to monetary easing 
than the banks that have less than the average. This result is consistent with theoretical 
predictions and implies that bank lending channel has meaningful economic power in 
the Turkish economy. 
 
During the taken period, 2003:IV-2006-II, interest rates had a decreasing trend. 
Hence, it should be noted as a shortfall of this study while it is not possible to identify a 
lending channel as motivated by the theory. This shortfall should be taken into account 
for future research.  
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